Abstract-Today's large-scale distributed storage systems are commonly built using commodity software and hardware. As a result, crash-stop and Byzantine failures in such systems become more and more prevalent. In the literature, regenerating codes have been shown to be a more efficient way to disperse information across multiple storage nodes and recover from crash-stop failures. In this paper, we propose a novel decoding design of product-matrix constructed regenerating codes in conjunction with integrity check that allows exact regeneration of failed nodes and data reconstruction in the presence of Byzantine failures. A progressive decoding mechanism is incorporated in both procedures to leverage computation performed thus far. Unlike previous works, our new regenerating code decoding has the advantage that its building blocks, such as Reed-Solomon codes and standard cryptographic hash functions, are relatively well-understood because of their widespread applications. The fault tolerance and security properties of the proposed schemes are also analyzed. In addition, the performance of the proposed schemes, in terms of the average number of access nodes and the reconstruction failure probability versus the node failure probability, are also evaluated by Monte Carlo simulations.
To achieve persistent storage, one common approach is to disperse information pertaining to a data file (the message) across nodes in a network. For instance, with [n, k] maximumdistance-separable (MDS) codes, such as Reed-Solomon (RS) codes, data are encoded and stored across n nodes, while an end user or a data collector can retrieve the original data file by accessing any k of the storage nodes, a process referred to as data reconstruction.
Upon the failure of any storage node, data stored in the failed node need to be regenerated (recovered) to maintain the functionality of the system. A straightforward way for data recovery is to first reconstruct the original data and then regenerate the data stored in the failed node. However, it is wasteful to retrieve the entire B symbols of the original file, just to recover a fraction of that stored in the failed node. A more efficient way is to use the so-called regenerating codes which was introduced in the pioneering works by Dimakis et al. in [1] , [2] . In data regeneration, each storage node stores α symbol and a total of d surviving nodes are accessed to retrieve β ≤ α symbols from each node. A trade-off can be made between the storage overhead and the repair bandwidth needed for regeneration. Minimum Storage Regenerating (MSR) codes minimize first, the amount of data stored per node, and then the repair bandwidth, while Minimum Bandwidth Regenerating (MBR) codes carry out the minimization in the reverse order. The design of regenerating codes have received much attention in recent years [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] . Most notably, Rashmi et al. proposed optimal exactregenerating codes using a product-matrix reconstruction that recovers exactly the same stored data of the failed node (and thus the name exact-regenerating) [11] .
Existing work assumes crash-stop failures on storage nodes. However, with Byzantine failures, the stored data may be tampered resulting in erroneous data reconstruction and regeneration. In [12] , the code capability and resilience were presented for error-correcting regenerating codes. The authors also stated that it is possible to decode an errors. However, no explicit decoding procedure was provided. Thus it remains an open problem as to whether practical decoding algorithms can be designed with such an error correction capability. 1 1 In fact, Dimakis et al. stated several open problems in the end of their survey on regenerating codes [13] . Specifically, Open Problems 2 and 4 stated in [13] explicitly call for ways to "repair" Reed-Solomon codes in order to fully realize the potential advantages of reduced update complexity and efficient decoding under errors in distributed storage applications. These open problems are partially settled by the results in this paper.
0090-6778/14$31.00 c 2014 IEEE Specifically, as inspired by [11] , we consider the problem of exact regeneration for Byzantine fault tolerance in distributed storage networks and design practical decoding algorithms for RS-code-based MBR and MSR codes that can tolerate Byzantine faults. Two challenging issues arise when nodes may fail arbitrarily besides erasure faults. First, we need to verify whether the regenerated or reconstructed data are correct. Second, efficient algorithms are needed that incrementally retrieve additional stored data and perform data reconstruction and regeneration when errors have been detected. Cryptographic hash function is adopted to verify the integrity of stored data. 2 In particular, for data reconstruction, the hash value is coded along with the original data and distributed among storage nodes. For data regeneration, hash values for each storage node are stored distributively to ensure the correctness of verification in face of node failures. Incremental retrieval, reconstruction and regeneration are made possible by the use of a progressive decoding procedure. Finally, we would like to emphasize that it is of practical significance to be able to tackle a new challenge using a new solution approach with well-understood ingredients (i.e., decoders of RS codes in this case). The proposed decoding schemes are conceptually novel and practically significant.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Related work is briefly surveyed in Section II. We give an overview of regenerating codes and RS codes in Section III to prepare the readers with necessary background. The design of errorcorrecting exact regenerating codes for the MSR points and MBR points are presented in Section IV and Section V, respectively. Section VI provides performance evaluation of the proposed schemes. Finally, we conclude the paper in Section VII.
II. RELATED WORK Regenerating codes were introduced in the pioneer works by Dimakis et al. in [1] , [2] . In these works, the so-called cut-set bound was derived which is the fundamental limit for designing regenerating codes. In these works, the data reconstruction and regeneration problems were formulated as a multicast network coding problem. From the cut-set bound between the source and the destination, the parameters of the regenerating codes were shown to satisfy the bound, which reveals the trade-off between storage and repair bandwidth. Those parameters satisfying the cut-set bound with equality were also derived.
The regeneration codes with parameters satisfying the cutset bound with equality were proposed in [3] , [4] . In [3] a deterministic construction of the regenerating codes with d = n − 1 was presented. In [4] , the network coding approach was adopted to design the regenerating codes. Both constructions achieved functional regeneration but not exact regeneration. Recently, a decentralized minimum-cost repair scheme was proposed in [14] .
Exact regeneration was considered in [5] [6] [7] . In [5] , a search algorithm was proposed to search for exactregenerating MSR codes with d = n − 1; however, no systematic construction method was provided. In [6] , the MSR codes with k = 2, d = n − 1 were constructed by using the concept of interference alignment, which was borrowed from the context of wireless communications. In [7] , the authors provided an explicit method to construct the MBR codes with d = n − 1. No computation is required for these codes during the regeneration of a failed node. Explicit construction of the MSR codes with d = k + 1 was also provided. However, these codes can perform exact regeneration only for a subset of failed storage nodes.
In [15] , the authors proved that exact regeneration is impossible for MSR codes with [n, k, d < 2k − 3] when β = 1. Based on interference alignment approach, a code construction was provided for the MSR codes with
In [11] , the explicit constructions for optimal MSR codes with [n, k, d ≥ 2k − 2] and optimal MBR codes were proposed. The construction was based on the product of two matrices: information matrix and encoding matrix. The information matrix (or its sub-matrices) is symmetric in order to have exact-regeneration property. However, the authors only considered crash-stop failures of storage nodes. In this work, we extend the code design in [11] to devise an efficient decoding scheme that can resist not only crash-stop failures but also Byzantine failures of storage nodes.
The progressive decoding mechanism for distributed storage was first introduced in [16] . The scheme retrieved just enough data from surviving storage nodes to recover the original data in the presence of crash-stop and Byzantine failures. The decoding was performed incrementally such that both the communication and computation costs can be minimized. In [16] , each data generating node generates the coded data without communicating with other data generating nodes, and distributes the coded data to the storage nodes. Only data reconstruction was considered in [16] . No regenerating scheme was proposed therein.
The problem of security on regenerating codes were considered in [8] [9] [10] . In [8] , the authors considered the security problem against eavesdropping and adversarial attackers during the regeneration process. They derived upper bounds on the maximum amount of information that can be stored safely. An explicit code construction was given for d = n − 1 in the bandwidth-limited regime. Later, the code based on productmatrix framework was proposed against the eavesdropping attack [9] . It can achieve the information-theoretic secrecy capacity. The problem of Byzantine fault tolerance for regenerating codes was considered in [10] . The authors studied the resilience of regenerating codes which support multi-repairs. By using collaboration among newcomers, upper bounds on the resilience capability of regenerating codes were derived. Even though our work also deals with the Byzantine failures, it does not need to have multiple newcomers to recover the failures. In [17] , the regenerating codes for erasure networks was considered. The fundamental bandwidth-storage tradeoffs was derived when erasure probability of channels was known. The maximum probability of successful data regeneration was also derived over erasure channels. In [18] , the problem of a minimum-cost repair for multi-hop storage networks with known topology and known link costs was investigated, where the repair cost was defined to be the total link costs required in the regeneration process. A lower bound of the repair cost was derived and strategies for cooperation among surviving nodes were devised for tandem, star, grid and fully connected networks. Both [17] and [18] focused on functional regeneration, but not exact regeneration. Kurihara and Kuwakado [19] analyzed the secrecy capacity of MBR codes, and proposed [n, k, d, m] secure regenerating codes that prevent information leakage even when an eavesdropper has data of m storage nodes or repairing data for m failed nodes.
The coding for errors and erasures for random linear network coding has been considered in [20] . In this work a ReedSolomon-like code was constructed and its decoding scheme was proposed.
In our earlier conference version [21] , we have proposed an MSR code to handle Byzantine failures for d = 2k − 2. In comparison, in this paper, we obtain a much more general result for exact regeneration with d up to n − 1. Additionally, instead of using cyclic redundancy check (CRC), we apply hash functions for data integrity, which is more tamperresistant. Finally, simulation study is carried out to study the performance of the proposed decoding mechanisms.
III. PRELIMINARIES

A. Regenerating Codes
Regenerating codes achieve bandwidth efficiency in the regeneration process by storing additional symbols in each storage node or accessing more storage nodes. Let α be the number of symbols over a finite field GF (q) stored in each storage node and β ≤ α the number of symbols downloaded from each storage during regeneration. To repair the stored data in the failed node, a newcomer accesses d surviving nodes with the total repair bandwidth dβ. In general, the total repair bandwidth is much less than B. A regenerating code can be used not only to regenerate coded data but also to reconstruct the original data symbols. Let the number of storage nodes be n. An [n, k, d] regenerating code requires at least k and d surviving nodes to ensure successful data reconstruction and regeneration [11] , respectively. Clearly, k ≤ d ≤ n − 1. An example of regeneration taken from [13] is given in Fig. 1 .
The main results given in [2] , [3] are the so-called cut-set bound on the repair bandwidth. It states that any regenerating code must satisfy the following inequality:
Minimizing α in (1) results in a regenerating code with minimum storage requirement; and minimizing β results in that with minimum repair bandwidth [11] . It is impossible to have minimum values both on α and β concurrently, and thus there exists a trade-off between storage and repair bandwidth. The two extreme points in (1) are referred to as the minimum storage regeneration (MSR) and minimum bandwidth regeneration (MBR) points, respectively. The values of α and β for MSR point can be obtained by first minimizing α and then minimizing β:
Reversing the order of minimization we have β and α for MBR as
As defined in [11] , an [n, k, d] regenerating code with parameters (α, β, B) is optimal if i) it satisfies the cut-set bound with equality, and ii) neither α nor β can be reduced unilaterally without violating the cut-set bound. Clearly, both MSR and MBR codes are optimal regenerating codes. It has been proved that when designing [n, k, d] MSR for k/(n + 1) ≤ 1/2 or MBR codes, it suffices to consider those with β = 1 [11] . Throughout this paper, we assume that β = 1 for code design. Hence (2) and (3) become
and
respectively, when β = 1. There are two ways to regenerate data for a failed node. If the replacement data generated is exactly the same as those stored in the failed node, we call it the exact regeneration. If the replacement data generated is only to guarantee the data reconstruction and regeneration properties, it is called functional regeneration. In practice, exact regeneration is more desired since there is no need to inform each node in the network regarding the replacement. In addition, it is easy to keep the code systematic via exact regeneration, where partial data can be retrieved without accessing k nodes. Throughout this paper, we only consider exact regeneration and design exact-regenerating codes with error-correction capabilities. We target for all possible n, k for the MBR points and k/(n+1) ≤ 1/2 for the MSR points.
B. Reed-Solomon codes
Since Reed-Solomon (RS) codes will be used in the design of regenerating codes, we briefly describe the encoding and decoding mechanisms of RS codes.
RS codes are well studied error-correction codes. They not only can recover data when nodes fail, but also can guarantee recovery when a subset of nodes are Byzantine. RS codes operate on symbols of m bits, where all symbols are from the finite field
, whereñ is the total number of symbols in a codeword, k is the total number of information symbols, and t is the symbol-error-correction capability of the code. Encoding: Let the sequence of k information symbols
The codeword polynomial, c(x), corresponding to u(x) can be encoded as [22] c(
where a is a generator (or a primitive element) in GF (2 m ). In the matrix form, the codeword
is encoded as c = uG ,
roots of c(x).
Decoding: The decoding process of RS codes is more complex. A complete description can be found in [23] .
Let r(x) be the received polynomial and
. . , a 2t as roots. This property is used to determine the error locations and recover the information symbols.
The RS codes are optimal in terms of the minimum Hamming distance as it meets the Singleton bound [23] . An [ñ, k] RS code can recover from any v errors as long
, where s is the number of erasure (or irretrievable symbols). The decoding that handles both error and erasure is called the error-erasure decoding.
In GF (2 m ), addition is equivalent to bit-wise exclusiveor (XOR), and multiplication is typically implemented with multiplication tables or discrete logarithm tables. To reduce the complexity of multiplication, Cauchy Reed-Solomon (CRS) codes [24] have been proposed to use a different construction of the generator matrix, and convert multiplications to XOR operations for erasure. However, CRS codes incur the same complexity as RS codes for error correction.
IV. ENCODING AND DECODING OF ERROR-CORRECTING EXACT-REGENERATING CODES FOR THE MSR POINTS
In this section, we demonstrate how to perform error correction on MSR codes designed to handle Byzantine failures by extending the code construction in [11] . The MSR code C with parameters [n,
. We call C the mother code of C. Note that the encoding and decoding of C are performed through C . By (4), we have
Hence, both codes share the same α and only differ in α information symbols. If we have a systematic version of C and set the last columns of information matrix U to zeros, then the actual number of storage nodes for C becomes n − = n, where U is an α × k matrix. In such case, C can be used to encode and decode the B symbols. It is clear that d = 2k − 2 and we have
We assume that the symbols in data are elements from GF (2 m ). Hence, the size of the data is mB bits for β = 1.
A. Verification for Data Reconstruction
Since we need to design codes with Byzantine fault tolerance it is necessary to perform integrity check after the original data are reconstructed. Two common verification mechanisms can be used: CRC and cryptographic hash function. Both methods add redundancy to the original data before they are encoded. In order to enhance the strength of verification on storage data, cryptographic hash function [25] is utlized in this work.
A cryptographic hash function is a one-way function that takes an arbitrary block of data and returns a fixed-size binary string, namely, the hash value. Modifying the input data without changing the hash value is computationally infeasible [25, Chapter 9] . Furthermore, it is also infeasible to generate the input data given the hash value alone. The design of cryptographic hash functions is usually based on block ciphers such as AES. Since the length of input data of a block cipher is fixed to some numbers, the Merkle-Damgård construction is adopted [26] , [27] . A common length of the hash value is 224 bits as in SHA-224 [28] . 5 Since the size of the original data is usually large, the redundancy added by imposing a cryptographic hash function is acceptable. For example, for a [100, 20, 38] MSR code with α = 19, B = 19 × 20 = 380, we need to operate on GF (2 11 ) such that the size of the original data is 4180 bits. 6 The redundancy added by the a cryptographic hash function is 224/4180 = 5.4%. Hence, in the following, we assume that the hash value has been added to the original data and the resultant size is B symbols.
B. Encoding
We arrange the information sequence
into an information matrix U with size α×k such that the first k columns contain the B symbols of the information sequence and the last columns of U are zeros. Let the generator matrix, G, of the MSR code is chosen as 5 A shorter lengh of hash value (160 bits) can be used such as in SHA-1; however, the security strength becomes weaker. 6 The reason to choose GF (2 11 ) will be clear in the next section.
, and a is a generator of GF (2 m ). Note that G is a generator matrix of the [n , d ] RS code. One important property of G is that any k columns are linearly independent. The information matrix U to be encoded is obtained as
where p i (x) is a polynomial with all elements in the ith row of U as its coefficients, that is,
j=0 u ij x j and u ij , 1 ≤ j ≤ k, are the first k elements in the ith row of U . In the matrix form, we have
where 0 is all zero matrix with size α × and C is the codeword vector with dimension (α × n). Note that each row of C is decoded separately in all decoding procedures. Finally, the ith column of C is distributed to storage node i for 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
The generator matrix G of the RS code can be reformulated as
whereḠ contains the first α rows in G and Δ is a diagonal matrix with
. . , (a n −1 ) α to be all distinct. This can be guaranteed if this code is over GF (2 m ) for m ≥ log 2 n and gcd(2 m − 1, α) = 1. It is easy to see that the α symbols stored in storage node i is
where g T i is the ith column inḠ. Next we present the process to calculate the entries of U from U . The process is similar to the decoding process given in [11] . Recall that U G k = U, where G k is the last k columns of G. That is
MultiplyingḠ T k to (9), we havē
where
and the (j, i)th element is given by
Combining (11) and (12) we can obtain the values of p ij and q ij since a (j−1)α = a (i−1)α for all i = j, p ij = p ji , and
Since the only unknown elements in P are those on diagonal and
we have ith row of P excluding the element on diagonal as
Since k = α + 1 and
is invertible due to construction, we can obtainḡ
is invertible, we can solve for Z 1 . Z 2 can be obtained similarly from Q. A final remark is that each column in G can be generated by knowing the index of the column and the generator a. Therefore, each storage node does not need to store the entire G to perform exact regeneration.
C. Decoding for Data Reconstruction
The generator polynomial of the [n , d ] RS code encoded by (7) has a n−d , a n−d−1 , . . . , a as roots [23] . 7 Without loss of generality, we assume that the data collector retrieves encoded symbols from k storage nodes j 0 , j 1 , . . . , j k−1 and forms the received matrix Y α×k . First, the information sequence m is recovered by the procedure given in Section IV-B as follows.
The data collector pads columns of zeros to Y α×k to form Y α×k . It then collects the k columns of G corresponding to storage nodes j 0 , j 1 , . . . , j k−1 as the first k columns ofḠ k and the last columns from the last columns of G. The data collector calculates Ḡ k T Y α×k and obtains P and Q from Ḡ k T Y α×k via (11) and (12) . DenoteḠ k as
it obtainsp j by taking the jth row of P and deleting the jth element in it. It calculates
and then obtains
Z 2 can be obtained by replacing P with Q in the above procedure. Then multiplying U = [Z 1 Z 2 ] byḠ k to obtain the original U and the information sequence m.
If the recovered information sequence does not pass the integrity check, we need to perform the error-erasure decoding. In addition to the received encoded symbols from k storage nodes, the data collector needs to retrieve the encoded symbols from d + 2 − k storage nodes of the remaining storage nodes. The data collector then performs error-erasure decoding to obtain m. 8 If the recovered information sequence passes the integrity check, the process finishes; otherwise, two more symbols need to be retrieved. The data collector continues the decoding process until it successfully recovers the correct information sequence or no more storage nodes can be accessed. In each step, the progressive decoding that we proposed in [16] is applied to reduce the computation complexity. Note that the RS code used is capable of correcting up to (n−d)/2 errors.
The decoding algorithm with integrity check is summarized in Algorithm 1. Note that, in practice, Algorithm 1 will be repeated β times for each retrieved symbol when β > 1. 
D. Verification for Regeneration
To verify whether the recovered data are the same as those stored in the failed node, integrity check is needed. However, such a check should be performed based on information stored on nodes other than the failed node. We consider two mechanisms for verification.
In the first scheme, each storage node keeps the hash values for the remaining n − 1 storage nodes. When the newcomer accesses d surviving storage nodes, it also asks for the hash values for the failed node from them. Using the majority vote on all received hash values, the newcomer can 7 Recall that n − d = n − d. 8 The information sequence is now part of the codeword due to the construction of U from U . 9 By definition, β is the number of symbols sent out from each of the d surviving nodes. Hence, it should be kept as an integer by modifying B. When β is small, we adopt an error-correcting code to encode the r-bit hash value. This can improve the storage and bandwidth efficiency. First we select the operating finite field
code withk = r/m is used to encode the hash value. Note that this code is different from the RS code used for MSR data regeneration. In encoding the hash value of a storage node into n − 1 symbols and distributing them to the n − 1 other storage nodes, extra (n − 1)m bits are needed on each storage node. When the newcomer accesses d storage nodes to repair the failed node i, these nodes also send out the symbols associated with the hash value for node i. The newcomer then can perform error-erasure decoding to recover the hash value.
The maximum number of compromised storage nodes among the accessed d nodes that can be handled by this approach is (d −k)/2 and the extra bandwidth is dm . Since m is much smaller than n − 1 and r, the redundancy for storage and bandwidth can be reduced. Taking the previous numerical example, we have m = 8 andk = 28. Note that after the newcomer regenerates the data stored in the failed node, it requests the hash values from the other n − 1 nodes.
E. Decoding for Regeneration
Let node i be the failed node to be recovered. During regeneration, the newcomer accesses s surviving storage nodes, where d ≤ s ≤ n − 1. Without loss of generality, we assume that the storage nodes accessed are j 0 , j 1 ,. . ., j s−1 . Every accessed node takes the inner product between its α symbols and
where g i can be generated by index i and the generator a, and sends the resultant symbol to the newcomer. Since the MSR code is a linear code, the resultant symbols transmitted, y j0 , y j1 , y j2 , . . . , y js−1 , that are appended 0's, can be decoded to the codeword c, where 
Recall that g i is the transpose of ith column ofḠ, the first α rows in G. Since Z j , for j = 1, 2, are symmetric matrices,
The α symbols stored in the failed node i can then be calculated as
The progressive decoding procedure in [16] can be applied in decoding y j0 , y j1 , y j2 , . . . , y js−1 . First, the newcomer accesses d storage nodes and decodes y j0 , y j1 , y j2 , . . . , y j d−1 to obtain c and α symbols by (14) . Then, it verifies the hash value. If the integrity check is passed, the regeneration is successful; otherwise, two more surviving storage nodes need to be accessed. Then the newcomer decodes the received y j0 , y j1 , y j2 , . . . , y j d+1 to obtain c and recover α symbols.
The process repeats until a sufficient number of correctly stored data have been retrieved to recover the failed node. Again, in practice, when β > 1, the decoding needs to be performed β times to recover βα symbols before verifying the hash value. The data regenerating algorithm with integrity check is summarized in Algorithm 2.
Algorithm 2: Decoding of MSR Codes for Regeneration begin
Assume node i is failed. The newcomer randomly chooses d storage nodes; Each chosen storage node combines its symbols as a (β × α) matrix and multiply it by g i in ( The newcomer accesses two more remaining storage nodes; Each chosen storage node combines its symbols as a (β × α) matrix and multiply it by g i given in (13); The newcomer merges the resultant vectors into Y β×j ; until j ≥ n − 2; return FAIL;
V. ENCODING AND DECODING OF ERROR-CORRECTING EXACT-REGENERATING CODES FOR THE MBR POINTS
In this section we demonstrate that by selecting the same RS codes as that for MSR codes and designing a proper decoding procedure, the MBR codes in [11] can be extended to handle Byzantine failures. Since the verification procedure for MBR codes is the same as that of MSR codes, it is omitted.
A. Encoding
Let the information sequence m = [m 0 , m 1 , . . . , m B−1 ] be arranged into an information matrix U with size α × d such that
In the matrix form, we have
We apply an [n, d] RS code to encode each row of U . Let p i (x) be the polynomial with all elements in the ith row of U as its coefficients. That is,
Recall that a is a generator of GF (2 m ). In the matrix form, we have
and C is the codeword vector with dimension (α × n). G is called the generator matrix of the [n, d] RS code. G can be divided into two sub-matrices as
Note that G k is a generator matrix of the [n, k] RS code and it will be used in the decoding process for data reconstruction.
B. Decoding for Data Reconstruction
The generator polynomial of the RS code encoded by (17) has a n−k , a n−k−1 , . . . , a as roots [23] . Hence, the progressive decoding scheme given in [16] can be applied to decode the proposed code if there are errors in the retrieved data. Unlike the decoding procedure given in Section IV-C, where an [n, d] RS decoder is applied, we need an [n, k] RS decoder for MBR codes.
Without loss of generality, we assume that the data collector retrieves encoded symbols from s storage nodes 
We then calculateÃ 
Applying the RS decoding algorithm again on Y k we can recover A 1 asÃ
Hash value is computed on the decoded information sequence to verify the recovered data. If the integrity check is passed, the data reconstruction is successful; otherwise the progressive decoding procedure is applied, where two more storage nodes need to be accessed from the remaining storage nodes in each round until no further errors are detected. The detailed data reconstruction algorithm can be found in our conference version [21] .
C. Decoding for Regeneration
Decoding for regeneration with MBR is very similar to that with MSR. After obtaining g i · U , we take its transposition. Since U is symmetric, we have U T = U and
A integrity check is performed on all βα symbols. If the integrity check is passed, the βα symbols are the data stored in the failed node; otherwise, the progressive decoding procedure is applied.
VI. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
In this section, we first analyze the fault-tolerance capability of the proposed codes in presence of crash-stop and Byzantine failures, and then carry out numerical simulations to evaluate the performance for proposed schemes.
A. Fault-tolerance capability
In analyzing the fault-tolerance capability, we consider two types of failures, namely, crash-stop failures and Byzantine failures. Nodes are assumed to fail independently (as opposed in a coordinated fashion). In both cases, the fault-tolerance capability is measured by the maximum number of failures that the system can handle to maintain correctness.
Crash-stop failure: Crash-stop failures can be viewed as an erasure in the codeword. Since at least k nodes need to be available for data reconstruction, it can be shown that the maximum number of crash-stop failures that can be tolerated in data reconstruction is n − k. For regeneration, d nodes need to be accessed. Thus, the fault-tolerance capability is n − d − 1. Note that since all live nodes contain correct data, the associated hash values are also correct.
Byzantine failure: In general, in RS codes, two additional correct code fragments are needed to correct one erroneous code fragment. However, in the case of data regeneration, the capability of the newcomer to obtain the correct hash value also matters. In the analysis, we assume that the majority rule scheme is used in the process to obtain the correct hash value. Data regeneration fails if the newcomer cannot obtain the correct hash value even when the number of compromised nodes is less than the maximum number of faults the RS code can handle. Hence, we must take the minimum of the capability of the RS code (in MBR and MSR) and the capability to recover the correct hash value. Thus, with MSR and MBR codes, erroneous nodes can be tolerated in data reconstruction. On the other hand, the fault-tolerance capability of MSR and MBR codes for data regeneration are both min
. Table I summarizes the quantitative results of the faulttolerance capability of MSR and MBR codes.
B. Simulation study
The performance of the proposed decoding scheme for MSR and MBR codes are evaluated by Monte Carlo simulations. For comparison, the performance of a traditional decoding scheme that is non-progressive is also provided. For the nonprogressive decoding scheme, after k nodes are accessed, if the integrity check fails, the data collector will access all remaining n−k nodes in data reconstruction. Similarly, after d nodes are accessed, if the integrity check fails, the newcomer will access all remaining surviving n − d − 1 nodes in data regeneration. Each data point is generated from 10 4 simulation results. Storage nodes may fail arbitrarily with the Byzantine failure probability ranging from 0 to 0.5. In both schemes, [n, k, d] is chosen to be [100, 20, 38] . 10 Thus α = 19, and the largest possible n = n+ = 100+100−1−2×20+2 = 241. For MSR codes, as discussed in Section IV-B, for the finite field GF (2 m ), m needs to satisfy m ≥ log 2 n and gcd(2 m − 1, α) = 1. This gives m = 8 as 2 8 = 256 ≥ 241 is co-prime to 19. The finite field associated with MBR can be made smaller (e.g., m = 7). For simplicity, in the simulations, we select the same operating finite field GF (2 8 ) for both MSR and MBR codes. Figure 2 and Figure 3 show the performance of the MSR code in data reconstruction and regeneration, respectively. As shown in Fig. 2 , as the failure probability of each node reduces, the average number of nodes accessed and the failure rate of reconstruction decrease. When the failure probability reduces to 0, there are k = 20 nodes that need to be accessed. This is due to the fact that at least k nodes need to be accessed in data reconstruction for the [100, 20, 38] code. When the failure probability is 0.4, or roughly 40 nodes failed, one needs to retrieve data from all 100 nodes. Meanwhile, when the actual number of failure nodes is greater than 31, reconstruction is less feasible with MSR. 11 As a result, when the failure probability is around 0.31, roughly only half of the time, the reconstruction is successful. Similar observations 11 The error-erasure decoding adopted in the progressive decoding procedure in [16] can decode up to 80 errors; however, its decoding capability depends on the order of accessing extra nodes. can be made for regeneration as shown in Fig. 3 . The main differences are i) when the failure probability is 0, d = 38 nodes need to be accessed, and ii) the maximum number of accessible nodes is n − 1 = 99 in presence of a single failure node. It is not surprising that the proposed decoding scheme has a smaller average number of accesses than the traditional one. Moreover, the advantage is more pronounced in presence of Byzantine faults. Specifically, the proposed scheme has a lower failure rate than the traditional one because the failure nodes may be not accessed in the progressive decoding when the number of the failure nodes is larger than the faulttolerance capability. Figure 4 and Figure 5 show the performance of the MBR code in data reconstruction and regeneration, respectively. Again, as the failure probability reduces, the total number of nodes accessed and the failure rate of reconstruction and regeneration decrease. When comparing Fig. 4 with Fig. 2 , we see a slower growth in both qualities as the failure probability increases. This is because in MBR, if there exists an error in the first k = 20 nodes accessed, only two extra nodes are needed for each error, while with MSR codes, d − k = 18 nodes need to be accessed first and two extra nodes are needed for each additional error (Algorithm 1). In contrast, the performance of the MBR code for code regeneration is identical to that of the MSR code. The advantage of the proposed scheme over the traditional non-progressive decoding scheme is similar to that in the case of the MSR code. 
VII. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, the problem of exact regeneration with error correction capability for Byzantine fault tolerance in distributed storage networks has been addressed. We showed that the Reed-Solomon codes combined with cryptographic hash functions can be used for both data reconstruction and regeneration, and can realize both MSR and MBR. Progressive decoding can be applied in both application scenarios to reduce the computation complexity in presence of erroneous data. Finally, we analyzed the fault-tolerance capability of the proposed schemes and carried out Monte Carlo simulation studies. We found that both the average number of access nodes and the reconstruction failure probability were significantly lower with the the proposed schemes for MSR and MBR. The proposed MSR and MBR codes generalized our earlier results for MSR codes. By utilizing well-understood components such as RS codes and hash functions, our proposed schemes hold promises in practical implementation in both software and hardware.
The decoding schemes proposed here are for MSR and MBR codes based on the product-matrix construction. As future work, it will be interesting to see whether the similar idea can be extended to codes based on the interference alignment construction. Furthermore, it has been shown that exact regeneration is impossible for MSR codes with [n, k, d < 2k − 3] when β = 1. That is, the rates of codes considered in this work are roughly less than 1/2. In the future work, we would like to examine high-rate codes with functional regeneration in their Byzantine fault tolerance.
